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Abstract
Some retirement plans allow the participant to choose how funds are invested. Having to direct
investments may provide the participant with ®nancial education. This paper ®nds that
U.S. households covered by pension plans in which the employee chooses investments are
signi®cantly more apt to hold stock outside of their retirement plan than are households with
pension plans oﬀering no such choice. The eﬀect of investment choice upon non-pension asset
allocation is not explained by portfolio rebalancing or observable diﬀerences in income and
saving preferences across households. This provides some evidence that the design of a pension
plan may in¯uence an employee's ®nancial decisions outside of the pension plan, although
unobserved heterogeneity in worker's preferences could also explain the result.
The past two decades has seen a dramatic shift in private pension plans in the U.S. In
1975, 39% of the workforce was covered by a de®ned bene®t pension plan and only
14% was covered by a de®ned contribution plan (US Department of Labor (1997)).
Twenty years later, de®ned contribution plan coverage was nearly 40% while about
one in four workers had a de®ned bene®t plan." Workers now play a more active role
in providing for their retirement through work. Many de®ned contribution plans,
most notably 401(k)s, allow participants to control the level of contributions and in
some cases direct how assets are invested.# While much attention has been given to
how such retirement plans aﬀect the leel of saving (Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996),
Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996)), less research has addressed how they aﬀect a
household's composition of saving or portfolio decisions. Given the equity premium
* I thank Jeﬀ Brown, Courtney Coile, Peter Diamond, Jonathan Gruber, Jerry Hausman, Martha Starr-
McCluer, Jim Poterba, and two anonymous referees for useful comments. Financial support from the
National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Aging is gratefully acknowledged. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the National Bureau of
Economic Research.
" A de®ned bene®t (DB) plan is a formula-based retirement plan. The typical DB plan provides a lifetime
nominal annuity at retirement, with the bene®t being a function of years of service, highest salary earned,
etc. In a de®ned contribution (DC) plan, employees make contributions to an individual account based
on employee salary, employee contributions, employer match, and}or employer pro®ts. The worker is
responsible for gains and losses that accrue in the account. Examples of DC plans are money purchase
plans, ESOPs, thrift or savings plans, TIAA-CREF, and 401(k)s. In 1993, contributions to 401(k) plans
accounted for over 2}3 of total DC plan contributions (Bassett, Fleming, and Rodrigues (1998)).
# 1993 Form 5500 ®lings indicate that 65% (73% when weighted by assets and 73% when weighted
by participants) of 401(k) plans with 100 or more participants were participant-directed (US GAO
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observed in the United States over the past century, the question of how people save
is as relevant as the amount they save.$ Previous studies of investment allocation
within pension accounts generally do not have or do not exploit information on non-
pension investments. This paper adds to the literature by testing whether the design
of a pension plan can impact a household's non-pension asset allocation.
My hypothesis is that retirement plans in which workers are given a choice as to
how assets are invested provide ®nancial education to workers they may not
otherwise receive. Household saving}investment decisions are particularly prone to
procrastination because the cost of a short-term delay in planning is low and there is
a ®xed cost in acquiring the information needed to make decisions.% The ®nancial
planning employees are `forced' to do when deciding how to invest their pension plan
assets eliminates this ®xed cost and thus may cause households to adjust the
composition of their non-pension (own-account) assets as well. Having to decide
between investing in a stock or bond fund, seeing ®rst hand the current and historical
return performance of equities versus ®xed income securities, and realizing the
relative ease with which investments in stocks can be made today (mutual funds, e-
trade, etc.) may cause workers to hold equity outside of their retirement plan. De®ned
contribution plans where the employer makes investment decisions, or formula plans
that depend on years of service, wage, age, etc., do not oﬀer this education
component.
If one is concerned about the amount of wealth that will be available for retirement,
one must be concerned not only about the level of saving, but how the savings are
invested. Understanding the spillover eﬀects of participant choice is also motivated by
the debate concerning Social Security reform. Many Social Security reform plans call
for universal saving accounts to complement the existing program, with individuals
having a choice between equity and bond funds similar to the Federal Employees'
Thrift Plan.
To better understand the eﬀect of participant-choice plans upon non-pension asset
allocation, it is useful to examine how the ®nances of households with various types
of pension coverage diﬀer. I exploit variation in the extent to which workers have a
choice as to how assets in a retirement plan are invested to test whether an `education'
eﬀect is present. Do the portfolios and equity holdings of households who must
decide how to invest their pension assets diﬀer from those who do not? If so, are the
diﬀerences attributable to the education received by being `forced', perhaps for the
®rst time, to make investment decisions?
The answer to the ®rst question is yes. Households in de®ned contribution (DC)
plans with participant choice as to how funds are invested are 23 percentage points
more likely to hold stock on own-account (i.e., outside of the retirement plan) than
are households in DC plans without choice. The answer to the second question is
more diﬃcult. Participation in pension plans is not a natural experiment, but rather
re¯ects a conscious decision. One has to be concerned that diﬀerences in non-pension
$ The reader should see Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) and Siegel and Thaler (1997) for a
discussion and review of the equity premium literature.
% Akerlof (1991) and O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) present models of procrastination and discuss the
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portfolios simply re¯ect diﬀerences in income level or saving preferences. Plans with
choice are not randomly distributed, and at least partly may respond to employees'
tastes. Financially savvy and risk-taking individuals may select into jobs with DC
plans where workers have a choice as to how assets are invested or ®nancially savvy
workers may request that employers provide participant-directed pension plans.
Thus,caution must beexercised wheninterpreting thecausality behindthe correlation
between choice and stock ownership.
Realizing the potential selectivity bias issues, the paper uses multiple methods to
control for investor heterogeneity. While there are observable diﬀerences in income
and saving preferences across households with investment choice in their DC plan
versus those without, these observable diﬀerences do not appear to be driving the link
between investment choice in the pension plan and equity ownership outside of the
plan. Alternative hypotheses, such as portfolio rebalancing, are considered but are
shown to not explain the diﬀerences in equity ownership outside of the retirement
plan. I also examine a segment of the population which is `®nancially unsavvy', and
for whom there are less diﬀerences in observable characteristics across households
with and without investment choice in their pension plan, to further test if diﬀerences
in equity ownership can be identi®ed as an education eﬀect.
Overall, the results suggest a strong correlation between choice in the pension plan
and non-pension household portfolio allocation, leading to a higher probability of
owning stock outside of the DC plan. This suggests that the design of the pension plan
may potentially impact employee ®nances. Such a change in asset composition could
have a non-trivial impact on a household's future wealth, given the equity premium
observed historically in the United States. While the results obtained are supportive
of an education eﬀect, it is important to remember that the presence of choice in the
pension plan is not a controlled experiment, and thus it is impossible to de®nitively
establish the causality of the relationship between pension plan choice and equity
ownership.
The paper will proceed as follows. Section 1 reviews the relevant literature on
retirement plans and saving, education and saving, and behavioral economics.
Section 2 describes the Survey of Consumer Finances, the primary data set used for
this study, and provides demographic and ®nancial attributes of households with
diﬀerent retirement plan coverage. The estimation strategy for determining whether
directing pension plan investments causes households to change the composition of
their non-pension ®nancial assets will be presented in Section 3. This section also
presents results and robustness checks. Section 4 oﬀers conclusions.
1 Literature review
This study draws from the literatures on retirement plans and saving, education and
saving, and behavioral economics. The contribution of this paper is that it focuses
upon how pension plans may in¯uence the composition of saving. The returns
historically available to investors indicate that the composition question is just as
important as the level question. Other studies of investment allocation within pension
accounts typically do not have much}any information on non-pension investments.226 S. Weisbenner
This paper adds to the literature by testing whether the design of a pension plan can
impact a household's non-pension asset allocation.
Research into pension plans and saving dates back at least to the work of Katona
(1965) and Cagan (1965) who observed that those with pension plans save more
directly than those without. This relationship runs counter to the predictions of a
simple life-cycle model in which pension wealth should oﬀset private wealth dollar for
dollar. They attribute this ®nding to `education' or `recognition' eﬀects, thus positing
that saving preferences are endogenous. However, this interpretation is clouded
because of saving heterogeneity across the population.
Since then, many researchers have further analyzed the relationship between
pension and non-pension wealth. Gale (1995) provides a review of this work and
concludes that, `taken at face value, the literature shows little oﬀset between pensions
and other wealth; most of the studies suggest oﬀsets of 20% or less, and almost half
suggest either no oﬀset at all or a positive eﬀect of pensions on other wealth'.
However, Gale (1998) argues such results are plagued by multiple biases and after
correcting for many of these ®nds relatively high levels of oﬀset. Gustman and
Steinmeier (1999a) address many of the concerns raised by Gale and ®nd that
pensions cause little, if any, displacement of other forms of wealth for a cohort of 51
to 61 year olds. The one conclusion that can be drawn from this literature is that no
strong consensus has emerged regarding the spillover eﬀects of pensions upon non-
retirement account ®nances.
A voluminous literature has studied what eﬀect 401(k) plans in particular have had
upon household wealth accumulation (see Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996) and
Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996) for a review). This literature has not focused
attention, however, on how 401(k) plans may have aﬀected the composition of
household assets. Particularly relevant for this paper, this debate has brought out the
concern that employers oﬀer 401(k) plans to satisfy a workforce of innate savers, or
that employees who are pre-disposed to save seek out ®rms with pension plans
matching their preferences.
Bayer, Bernheim, and Scholz (1996) (hereafter BBS), Bernheim and Garrett (2001)
(hereafter BG), and Bernheim, Garrett, and Maki (1997) (hereafter BGM) all study
the impact of direct ®nancial education upon the level of saving. BBS and BG focus
on investment education in the workplace using surveys of ®rms and households,
respectively. BBS ®nd retirement seminars increase contributions to savings plans and
BG ®nd positive eﬀects of ®nancial education upon both saving in general and saving
for retirement in particular.& BG also ®nd evidence of spillover eﬀects across spouses.
BGM study the impact of education on saving decisions by exploiting cross-sectional
and time series variation in high school requirements for ®nancial planning courses.
They also conclude direct education can in¯uence ®nancial decision-making.
The work of Bernheim and others suggests that direct education (e.g., seminars and
& An inherent problem in interpreting their results is that the presence of a saving program could be
systematically tied to worker preferences. The direction of the bias is not clear, though. Firms may
provide investment education to satisfy the demands of a workforce predisposed to save, or ®rms whose
workforce has a segment which is not predisposed to save may be more apt to oﬀer seminars in order
to relax nondiscrimination rules. BBS and BG present evidence that education is remedial, suggesting
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classes) may have important eﬀects on saving behavior. None of the studies address
how the composition of assets is aﬀected by investment education. This paper is also
diﬀerent from previous work in that it studies whether the less direct `education'
acquired simply through having to allocate assets in an employer sponsored
retirement plan impacts portfolio decisions. This raises the key question: In actuality
do workers who participate in a DC plan in which they choose how the funds are
invested receive any basic information about the investment options from the
employer, and do they have many investment options from which to choose?
Section 404 (c) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) speci®es
when an employer is not liable for investment results when he provides participant
choice. The 404 (c) regulations require that the plan oﬀer a broad range of invest-
ment choices (at least three core options must present materially diﬀerent risk}
return characteristics), allow participants to give investment instructions concerning
the three core options at least quarterly, and provide suﬃcient information for
informed investment choices. The Employee Bene®t Research Institute (1994 and
1995) reports 73% of 401(k) participants are provided some educational material.
Further, 92% of 401(k) participants read materials given by employers and 44%
say doing so causes them to invest diﬀerently. Typical investment options are
corporate equity (sometimes a ®rm's own stock), guaranteed investment contracts,
US government securities, corporate bonds, and balanced funds. The mean number
of investment options provided by employees was 5±4 in the mid 1990s (Buck
Consultants (1994)), and has grown over time (Benartzi and Thaler (2001) and
Liang and Weisbenner (2002)), so there is some choice to be made.
Nonetheless, several papers document the substantial limitations of individuals'
understanding of their pension plans and the simplistic investment strategies 401-k
participants employ, casting some doubt on the ®nancial education 401(k)
participation provides. For example, Mitchell (1988) and Gustman and Steinmeier
(1999b) ®nd that a sizeable fraction of surveyed employees cannot even correctly
identify what type of pension plan they are oﬀered (whether the plan is a de®ned
bene®t or a de®ned contribution plan).
Looking at a database of retirement plans, Benartzi and Thaler (2001) ®nd that the
fraction of assets invested in equities depends strongly on the number of equity funds
in the plan. Liang and Weisbenner (2002), also provide evidence that workers seem
to employ naõ$ve diversi®cation strategies. Using 11(k) ®lings, they ®nd that workers
invest 1}n of their contributions in company stock on average, where n represents the
number of options in the plan. These ®ndings suggest that we might expect any
spillovers to own-account investing to be minimal. If participants continue to invest
equally across all investment options provided, regardless of characteristics, it is
doubtful they have acquired any ®nancial education that they can apply to their non-
pension ®nances. However, education need not occur only at the time of the ®rst
allocation decision. Participants may split funds among alternatives initially, and then
slowly adjust as they observe the pattern of returns across plan alternatives. Looking
at TIAA-CREF participants over a ten-year period, Ameriks and Zeldes (2001) ®nd
that 53% of participants change their contribution allocation at least once and 20%
changed at least three times. Thus, while a sizeable segment of the population exhibits228 S. Weisbenner
inertia with regards to their investment behavior, some participants are willing to
change their investment strategy over time.
Madrian and Shea (2000) and Choi et al. (2001) ®nd that the new workers in plans
that have recently changed to automatic enrollment (workers are enrolled in the plan
unless they opt out) tend to simply follow the default investment option provided by
the plan, which is typically a money market fund. However, workers in plans that
require the participant to aﬃrmatively opt into the 401(k) plan and make an
allocation decision tend to invest much less in money market funds and a much higher
share in equities. Thus, forcing the worker to actively make a choice as to how
contributions are allocated can alter the composition of saving. If all ®rms have
automatic enrollment, and workers exhibit `default' behavior, then the 401(k) plan
likely provides little education to workers. However, while use of automatic
enrollment has grown in recent years, Hewitt Associates (2001) reports that only 7%
of companies utilized automatic enrollment in 1999. Particularly relevant for this
paper that utilizes the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances, automatic enrollment was
essentially non-existent prior to a U.S. Treasury ruling in 1998.
Lusardi (1999) reports that one third of the working respondents aged 50±61 in the
®rst wave of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) have `hardly at all' thought
about saving for retirement. This is disturbing, particularly since Lusardi ®nds that
responses to the `How much have you thought about retirement?' question help
predict actual wealth accumulation. However, the respondent is much more likely to
answer that he has thought about saving for retirement if he has a pension plan
and}or his employer has oﬀered a retirement seminar, suggesting plans with
investment choice could have an education eﬀect.
Most in spirit with this paper, Papke (1998) also investigates the economic impact
of participant-directed retirement plans. However, her question of interest is distinct
from mine. She examines how asset allocation, participant contributions, and account
balances within the retirement plan diﬀer across account-based plans with and
without employee investment choice. Her preferred estimates indicate that partici-
pants with choice invest 15 percentage points more in stocks and contribute almost
5 percentage points more in salary. She does not consider spillover eﬀects upon non-
pension (own-account) assets. She also utilizes a diﬀerent data source than this paper.
Her sample is drawn from the 1992 National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Women,
which is a sample of women aged 55±69 and their husbands. Bajtelsmit and
VanDerhei (1997), Hinz, McCarthy, and Turner (1997), and Sunden and Surette
(1998) also examine how asset allocation in de®ned contribution accounts diﬀers
across demographic characteristics, such as age and gender, and income levels.
However, none of these studies consider how pension plans may in¯uence non-
pension asset allocation.
At this point it is natural to ask, why should participation in a retirement plan with
participant choice alter a worker's perceptions of risk and provide any ®nancial
education. Shouldn't the worker receive this information on his own? Undoubtedly
inertia, procrastination, or psychic costs provide what are perceived by some
households to be real impediments to investing more heavily or at all in stocks. For
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Survey of Consumer Financial Decisions stated that `they did not know enough
about the stock market' as a reason for not holding equity.
In a behavioral economics context, participation in a retirement plan with
participant choice could have important repercussions (see Thaler (1994) for a
discussionofpsychologyandsavingbehavior). Time-inconsistentpreferencescoupled
with a misprediction of one's own time-inconsistent preferences (one doesn't predict
one will keep putting things oﬀ) are likely to lead to procrastination in planning for
future events and making decisions, even decisions as important as investing for
retirement (Akerlof (1991) and O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999)). `A clear moral of the
procrastination model is that time inconsistent behavior is especially apt to occur
when there is some ®xed cost (perhaps not very great) to beginning a task ¼ and the
per period cost to delay is low (Akerlof (1991), p. 6).' Household ®nancial decisions
generally satisfy these conditions. Requiring workers to make investment choices in
their pension plan would likely have little spillover eﬀect on own-account ®nances in
a rational-choice model. However, if households tend to put oﬀ thinking about how
to best save for retirement, then having employees decide at work how to best invest
their 401(k) contributions will eliminate the ®xed cost of ®nancial planning. This may
cause households to quit procrastinating and adjust the composition of their non-
pension assets as well.'
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) propose a model in which investors gain utility not from
wealth levels but from returns, and households are loss averse. A household's attitude
towards risk then depends crucially upon the time horizon over which returns are
calculated. For example, the much greater variability in stock returns over shorter
horizons could make stocks look unattractive. The `psychic' damage they in¯ict upon
the investor could outweigh the return premium. A DC plan with participant-directed
investments may provide the household with asset return data to utilize when
deciding how to allocate contributions across fund options it may not obtain
otherwise. The employee will likely be presented with historical performance of fund
options over time periods from one to ®ve years, and will be provided with account
balances on a quarterly basis. Lengthening the time frame over which households
evaluate performance, even slightly, will likely increase their willingness to equitize
some of their non-pension ®nancial assets.
2 Data and attributes of households across pension plan coverage
I use the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). It is a cross-sectional survey
taken every three years by the Federal Reserve. The SCF over samples the rich
because asset ownership is skewed, so weights are needed to make the sample data
representative of the overall population. The 1995 sample consists of 4,299
households. The SCF has detailed data on asset ownership. It also asks questions
concerning pension plan coverage and ®nancial preferences. The 1995 survey has a
new question regarding whether the DC plan participant has `any choices about how
the money is invested.'
' Thaler and Shefrin (1981) discuss the role of Christmas Clubs at work in preventing procrastination and
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My unit of observation is the household because the SCF provides asset data on
a household basis and Bernheim and Garrett (2001) show strong spousal spillover
eﬀects. The SCF reports data for up to three pensions per person from his}her current
job. I restrict my sample to households where at least one spouse works for pay for
an employer and where neither spouse is 65 or older. If the self-employed spouse of
a worker sets up a retirement plan for the household, that household is also dropped
from the sample. The remaining subsample re¯ects 54% of the original sample, or
62% on a weighted basis.
Households in this subsample fall into one of ®ve categories based on employer-
provided retirement plan coverage.(
(1) household participates in at least one DC plan with investment choice
E referred to as CHOICE (34% of subsample, 32% weighted)
E 45% of these households are covered by just one plan and 31% have a DB
plan as well
(2) household participates in DC plan(s) but none allow investment choice
E referred to as NOCHOICE (12% of subsample, 12% weighted)
E 65% of these households are covered by just one plan and 25% have a DB
plan as well
(3) only have DB plan(s) and not oﬀered DC plan
E 9% of subsample, 9% weighted
(4) only have DB plan(s), eligible for but not participating in DC plan
E 6% of subsample, 7% weighted
(5) no employer-provided retirement plan
E 40% of subsample, 40% weighted
The ideal test of whether participant choice in retirement plans has any spillover
eﬀect on non-pension asset allocation would be to conduct a natural experiment on
workers that currently participate in a de®ned contribution plan that does not oﬀer
investment choice. Suppose the plan was changed to allow half of the participants to
choose pension plan investments (assignment to CHOICE was random). The
researcher could then follow workers over the next few years to test whether the
introduction of CHOICE resulted in a change in non-pension asset holdings.
Unfortunately, such data do not exist. The 1995 SCF provides one snapshot of
households' portfolios and details of their current pension plan coverage. Some of
these households participate in a de®ned contribution plan with participant choice.
Given the data limitations, a natural way to study if participant choice in retirement
plans has any spillover eﬀect on non-pension ®nances would be to compare
households who participate in a DC plan with choice to households who do not
control pension plan investments. The problem is to ®nd a suitable comparison
group.
Households with no pension plan coverage either are not oﬀered a retirement plan
( Note that groups (1)±(4) could be covered by multiple plans. This is because the unit of observation is
the household. For example, both spouses may work and be covered. Also, some employers oﬀer
multiple pension plans to individual workers. To belong to group (1), the household must be covered by
at least one pension plan in which they have control over investments. The household may also be
covered by DB plans or DC plans without choice. NOCHOICE households participate in DC plan(s),
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or choose not to participate in a ®rm's plan. These workers are on average younger,
poorer, and less educated than workers with pension plan coverage. Any conclusions
drawn by comparing the subpopulation of workers with no pension plan coverage to
workers with coverage are clearly dubious given the clear diﬀerences between the two
groups (both observable and unobservable).
Due to the diﬀerent nature of the pensions, one would expect the ®nancial decisions
of DC plan with choice vs. DB only households to diﬀer regardless of any education
eﬀect. The sign of the bias is not clear, however. For example, a household with a
generous DB plan may be more aggressive in own-account portfolio decisions than
a household with a 401(k) only. The larger is the component of wealth composed of
DB bene®ts, the more a household may wish to increase exposure to risk through
own-account investment in stocks.) On the other hand, DB plan participants are
typically older, closer to retirement, and more likely to be employed by large ®rms
and the public sector (Employee Bene®t Research Institute (1997) and author's
calculations using the SCF). Such characteristics would suggest the workers that hold
jobs that just oﬀer DB plans may be more risk-averse, and thus be predisposed to
hold bonds rather than stocks on their own account. Regardless of the direction of
the bias, it is clear, because of the self-selection issues, that comparing DC plan with
choice households with DB plan households will not provide a convincing means of
identifying the eﬀect of CHOICE.
Thus, the empirical analysis that follows will focus attention on group (1),
households that have at least one DC plan with choice, and group (2), households
that have at least one DC plan ± none of which allows investment choice. As an even
tighter comparison, I also examine households covered by just one pension plan (a
DC plan with or without participant-directed investments). It is important to point
out that this paper will not compare employees with DC plan coverage to either
workers that have no pension plan or workers that just have DB plan coverage,
because of the clear diﬀerences in observables (age, wealth, income) as well as
unobservables (risk aversion). Rather, I am focusing on households with de®ned
contribution plan coverage, and testing whether the presence of investment choice
aﬀects non-pension asset allocation decisions.
Tables1aand1bshowsthe®nancialanddemographiccharacteristicsofhouseholds
with various types of de®ned contribution plan coverage. Statistics are weighted using
1995 population weights in the SCF. The variables for the most part should be self-
explanatory. The demographic variables are de®ned as follows: `age' represents the
maximum age of the head or spouse in the household, `female' indicates whether the
household is headed by a single female (by convention males are labeled as the head
in couple households), and `college' indicates whether either spouse has attended at
least four years of college. The g of households represents the number of households
in the U.S. the speci®c subsample represents. Income represents before-tax family
income in 1994. Net worth represents the sum of ®nancial and non-®nancial assets
less all debt outstanding. It does not include the present discounted value of de®ned
bene®t plans, retirement account assets, or Social Security wealth. Financial assets
) Since future wages are stochastic and the employee may leave the ®rm, the actual level of DB bene®ts
is not guaranteed. Also, in¯ation risk makes the real value of DB pension wealth uncertain.232 S. Weisbenner
Table 1a. Income, net worth, and demographics of households with arious pension
plan coerage
Have DC plan(s)
(at least one
with CHOICE)
Have DC plan(s)
(none have
CHOICE)
Only 1 pension plan
(is a DC plan
with CHOICE)
Only 1 pension plan
(is a DC plan
without CHOICE)
g observations 779 272 344 174
g households 19±8 million 7±1 million 8±9 million 4±6 million
Income and net worth (in thousands of $)
(the mean, with its standard error in parentheses, and the 25th and 75th% are reported)
Income 65±04 5 ±25 4 ±84 1 ±3
(3±4) (2±3) (5±7) (3±0)
25th±75th% 35±74 26±57 30±60 22±50
Net worth 155±09 6 ±5 142±67 8 ±3
(21±5) (17±8) (38±2) (23±9)
25th±75th% 18±134 12±98 14±113 8±5±79
Financial assets 71±23 4 ±46 6 ±12 6 ±7
(15±0) (11±8) (26±7) (16±9)
25th±75th% 3±1±49 1±4±23 2±1±29 1±1±18
Equity ownership outside of the pension plan
Probability own stock " $1000 0±39 0±16 0±33 0±12
(0±02) (0±02) (0±03) (0±02)
Ratio of stock holdings to total 0±20 0±10 0±18 0±08
®nancial assets (0±01) (0±01) (0±02) (0±02)
Stock}Fin given own stock 0±45 0±41 0±48 0±42
(0±01) (0±04) (0±02) (0±05)
Demographics
Age 41±34 0 ±64 0 ±63 9 ±5
(0±4) (0±6) (0±6) (0±7)
Married 0±74 0±73 0±64 0±67
(0±02) (0±03) (0±03) (0±04)
Female 0±17 0±19 0±24 0±22
(0±01) (0±02) (0±02) (0±03)
College 0±47 0±39 0±41 0±37
(0±02) (0±03) (0±03) (0±04)
Notes: Data source is the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances and reported statistics are
weighted to re¯ect the population. See text for variable de®nitions.
CHOICE refers to a pension plan in which the employee makes investment decisions.
The mean is reported for all variables and the standard error of the mean is in parentheses.
`Stock}Fin' is the average of the ratio of non-pension stock holdings to ®nancial assets.
refer to non-pension ®nancial assets. It includes the Individual Retirement Account
(IRA) assets but excludes DC plan assets. Stock is de®ned as direct ownership of
stock or stock mutual funds, excluding ownership through retirement accounts
(DC plans). As with ®nancial assets, own-account (non-pension) stock includes
IRA equity holdings. The ownership of stock on own-account is the key variable
of interest.
The construction of a few variables merits some discussion. The SCF asks how DC
plan assets are invested. If the respondent answers `mostly or all in stock' or `split
between stock or interest earning assets,' 100% or 50%, respectively, of the account
balance is assumed to be invested in stock. IRA stock holdings are determined in the
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Table 1b. Retirement plan assets and saing preferences of households with arious
pension plan coerage
Have DC plan(s)
(at least one
with CHOICE)
Have DC plan(s)
(none have
CHOICE)
Only 1 pension plan
(is a DC plan
with CHOICE)
Only 1 pension plan
(is a DC plan
without CHOICE)
g observations 779 272 344 174
g households 19±8 million 7±1 million 8±9 million 4±6 million
DC plan assets 38±61 6 ±81 8 ±71 2 ±2
(4±7) (2±0) (3±6) (1±6)
25th±75th% 3±1±38 1±6±20 2±2±20 1±3±12
Share of DC plan in stock 0±60 0±53 0±57 0±49
(0±01) (0±02) (0±02) (0±03)
% DC plans mostly or all stock 0±32 0±33 0±38 0±31
(0±02) (0±03) (0±03) (0±04)
g Pension plans 1±81 ±41 1
(0±03) (0±04)
Have DB plan? 0±31 0±25 0 0
(0±02) (0±03)
IRA assets 42±62 0 ±85 0 ±91 9 ±4
(9±9) (7±3) (22±0) (10±7)
25th±75th% 5±0±38 3±0±20 4±0±30 3±0±20
Share of IRA in stock 0±57 0±31 0±58 0±21
(0±03) (0±05) (0±04) (0±06)
Have IRA? 0±36 0±24 0±34 0±25
(0±02) (0±03) (0±03) (0±03)
Love risk? 0±29 0±16 0±29 0±17
(0±02) (0±02) (0±02) (0±03)
Hate risk? 0±23 0±39 0±25 0±39
(0±01) (0±03) (0±02) (0±04)
NOSAVER? 0±48 0±65 0±50 0±63
(0±02) (0±03) (0±03) (0±04)
Notes: See text for variable de®nitions.
CHOICE refers to a pension plan in which the employee makes investment decisions.
DC plan assets and IRA assets are in thousands of dollars.
IRA assets are reported conditional on ownership.
The mean is reported for all variables and the standard error of the mean is in parentheses.
DC plan assets, or IRA assets invested in stock is the average of each household's
share.
I also create four variables to measure saving preferences and attitudes towards
risk, both of which may in¯uence the willingness of a household to invest in stock.
The SCF records whether or not you have any IRA assets (the stock not the ¯ow).
The SCF (Kennickell (1997)) also asks the following question that concerns risk-
aversion and thus willingness to invest in equities:
Which of the statements on this page comes closest to the amount of ®nancial risk that you and
your (spouse}partner) are willing to take when you save or make investments?
1. TAKE SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL RISKS EXPECTING TO EARN SUBSTAN-
TIAL RETURNS
2. TAKE ABOVE AVERAGE FINANCIAL RISKS EXPECTING TO EARN ABOVE
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3. TAKE AVERAGE FINANCIAL RISKS EXPECTING TO EARN AVERAGE
RETURNS
4. NOT WILLING TO TAKE ANY FINANCIAL RISKS
I de®ne the following three dummy variables: HAVEIRA (IRA assets "0),
LOVERISK (answers 1 or 2 to the question), HATERISK (answers 4 to the
question). HAVEIRA may indicate a predisposition to save. It is important to note,
however, that a past IRA `contribution' could be a rollover of DC plan assets from
a previous job rather than a direct contribution, and that universal IRA eligibility was
substantially curtailed in 1986. LOVERISK (HATERISK) represents a strong
willingness (aversion) to invest in risky assets like stocks.
The variable NOSAVER represents households that do not have IRA assets and
are not willing to take above average risks for above average returns. Thus,
NOSAVER¯1®maximum(HAVEIRA, LOVERISK).
Tables 1a and b demonstrates that households which participate in at least one
pension plan in which they determine the investments are much more apt to hold
stock outside of their pension plan relative to households covered by a DC plan(s)
which does not allow employees choice in investment decisions. Nearly 40% of
households which direct investments in their pension plan(s) hold at least $1000 of
stock on own-account (equities comprise 1}5 of ®nancial assets on average for this
group), while only one in six households with DC plan coverage without employee
investment choice hold stock outside of their retirement plan (equities comprise 1}10
of ®nancial assets on average for this group). The diﬀerences in equity holdings are
similar when we focus on households that are only covered by one de®ned
contribution plan.
Households that have choice in how assets are allocated in pension plans hold more
equities on own-account, which is consistent with the education hypothesis, but they
also diﬀer in important ways from no-choice DC plan households. While the two
groups are very similar along demographic variables, households that participate in
a DC plan with choice have higher wealth and income than families whose DC plan(s)
does not allow investment choice.*,"! The diﬀerences in mean income and net worth
are $19,800 and $58,500, respectively, and are still evident when the sample is
restricted to households with only one de®ned contribution plan. Most stark are
diﬀerences in IRA assets and saving preferences. For example, CHOICE households
are 13 percentage points more likely than NOCHOICE households to report being
willing to take above average risks to earn above average returns. They are also 12
percentage points more likely to have an IRA. It is important to note, though, that
* Some diﬀerences in income and net worth across CHOICE vs. NOCHOICE households is by
construction, as CHOICE households will by de®nition be more apt to be covered by multiple plans (1±8
vs. 1±4 plans for NOCHOICE) and be a two-earner family. Recall, a CHOICE household may also be
covered by additional DB plans and DC plans without participant choice, whereas a NOCHOICE
household may have supplemental DB plans but no DC plan which allows the participant to control
investments. This is why the paper also presents results with the sample restricted to households covered
by only one pension plan.
"! College degree attainment is the only demographic variable that is signi®cantly diﬀerent across CHOICE
and NOCHOICE households in the full sample (CHOICE households are 8 percentage points more
likely to have a college degree). However, there are no signi®cant or substantial diﬀerences in age, marital
status, female-headed households, or college degree attainment when we restrict attention to households
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preferences may change over time and that these diﬀerences could re¯ect the
`education' received by directing the investment of pension plan assets. Regression
analysis is necessary to disentangle how much of the diﬀerence in own-account stock
ownership across CHOICE and NOCHOICE households is attributable to the
presence of investment choice as opposed to diﬀerences in income and}or saving
preferences.
3 Estimation strategy and results
Recall, the education hypothesis suggests having employees decide at work how best
to invest their retirement funds will educate the employees about ®nancial planning.
This education may cause households to start to pay closer attention to their non-
pension asset allocation and to start to invest some of their own-account assets in the
stock market. Thus, the question of interest is whether requiring employees to decide
how to invest retirement account assets also impacts households' non-pension asset
allocation. The basic regression model I have in mind is:
(own stock)o r( stock share)¯b!­b"nCHOICE
­b#n(SAVING}RISK preferences)­b$nFinances
­b%nDemographics­e
Own stock is a categorical variable that is one if non-retirement account stock and
stock mutual fund holdings exceed $1000 (the results are not sensitive to the $1000
threshold) and stock share is the share of non-retirement ®nancial assets held in stocks
or stock mutual funds. CHOICE indicates whether the household participates in at
least one pension plan where investments are participant-directed.
The basic `experiment' I am considering is whether, among households with a DC
pension, those who direct investment of plan assets are more apt to own stock on
own-account. In the broadest test, CHOICE households are those that are covered by
at least one pension plan where they determine how funds are invested. They may
have additional DC plans with or without choice and supplemental DB plan coverage
as well. The `control' group, for whom CHOICE is zero, will be households
participating in at least one DC plan and perhaps covered by a de®ned bene®t plan.
However, none of these DC plans allow the participant to direct the investment of
assets. Thus, both CHOICE and NOCHOICE households have some provision for
retirement through work, but only CHOICE households have input into how the
retirement account is managed. As a more re®ned `experiment', I will also test if there
is any education or spillover eﬀect on non-pension investing by focussing on
households with only one pension plan which is either a DC plan with investment
choice or a DC plan without investment choice.
Given the sample focuses on DC plan participants, one should be reluctant to
extrapolate any results obtained from this group to the whole population. Since DC
plan participants are typically younger and more apt to be employed by small private
®rms relative to DB plan participants, they may also be more willing to take risks and
own stock. If DB plan participants are more risk-averse, then introducing investment
choice to this population may not lead to more stock ownership. An important
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segment of the workforce currently not covered by any retirement plan or just covered
by a de®ned bene®t pension to respond if a partial privatization of Social Security
occurs and universal 401(k)-type accounts are introduced?
Categorical variables for various net worth and income levels are included in the
speci®cation to re¯ect that wealthier households can absorb more risk (decreasing
relative risk aversion). Preferences may also vary with income}wealth. The same
reasoning justi®es the inclusion of a `have DB plan' dummy to re¯ect that having a
de®ned bene®t package in addition to the DC plan may alter risk-taking. Age should
also be a key explanator. A popular rule of thumb is that the percentage of one's
portfolio invested in equities should be 100 minus one's age (Bodie, Merton, and
Samuelson (1992) provide theoretical support for a decline in equity exposure with
age). Stock ownership may also decline with age because of cohort eﬀects such as
proximity to the Great Depression. College education, marital status, and the sex of
the head of the household may also in¯uence saving preferences and risk tolerance.
The key diﬃculty is how do we measure saving}risk tolerance preferences
properly? By omitting controls for them, we potentially introduce an omitted variable
bias into the results. Perhaps the correlation between CHOICE and non-pension
equity ownership re¯ects an underlying correlation between omitted saving}risk
taking preferences and equity ownership, which manifests itself in the CHOICE
coeﬃcient. This endogeneity could result from workers either demanding that
employers provide, or select jobs that oﬀer, retirement plans matching their saving
preferences.
Papke (1998) ®nds that participant choice and plan knowledge are not strongly or
signi®cantly correlated among NLS Mature Women respondents. She oﬀers this as
evidence that choice is not endogenous. However, diﬀerences in observable variables
across diﬀerent households could indicate diﬀerences in unobservables (e.g., saving
preferences and risk tolerance) as well.
There are two econometric strategies one can pursue.
(1) Find proxies that account for saving preferences}risk tolerance.
(2) Attempt to create a `natural experiment' by de®ning a control group that is
otherwise similar to the experimental group, except for exposure to choice in pension
plans.
3.1 Regressions of stock ownership/holdings
I ®rst adopt strategy (1). HAVEIRA, LOVERISK, and HATERISK serve as proxies
for saving preferences and risk tolerance."" It is important to note that preferences
need not be ®xed. For example, participant choice may provide education that causes
households to own more stock outside of their pension and changes saving
"" The SCF asks a host of questions (besides the IRA and risk-return questions) to gauge risk tolerance and
savings proclivities such as: What are your family's most important reasons for saving? (responses
include retirement, kid's education, emergencies), Do you save regularly?, Are there any foreseeable
major expenses?, Is it important to leave a bequest?, and Do you expect to leave a sizeable bequest to
others?. Responses to these questions were also included in the regression, but none of these other
variables were signi®cant in explaining non-pension stock ownership. Only the IRA and risk-return
dummies help explain equity ownership ± perhaps because they more directly}accurately indicate
whether the household has started to concentrate on saving for retirement (HAVEIRA) or is risk-averse
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preferences and risk tolerance. I thus report results both with and without the saving
preferences}risk tolerance proxies.
Table 2 displays the estimation results for the stock ownership and share of
®nancial assets regressions. Because Probit coeﬃcients are diﬃcult to interpret, the
coeﬃcients are transformed to re¯ect marginal changes in probability for a household
with average characteristics. The reported results are not weighted (weighting
observations with the population weights changes the coeﬃcients little).
From looking at simple tabs, heterogeneity in households across pension types was
evident. The key question is how much of the observed diﬀerence in non-pension
equity holdings across households with and without investment choice in their DC
plan is simply a re¯ection of diﬀerences in demographics, ®nancial situation, and
saving preferences and how much is really attributable to investment choice in the
pension plan.
Table 2 provides some evidence on this issue. The marginal eﬀect of CHOICE is
estimated to be a 17 percentage point increase in non-pension equity ownership (18%
when focus on households covered by only one DC plan) after controlling for
®nancial, demographic, saving, and risk tolerance covariates. Given that only one in
three households hold over $1000 of stock outside of their retirement plan, investment
choice in the DC plan appears to have a substantial impact upon a household's non-
pension asset allocation.
Estimates for the ®nancial and demographic characteristics are generally as
expected in the ownership regressions of Table 2. Age, ®nancial status, and college
education are consistently important determinants of equity ownership. The estimates
imply that, relative to the 30±39 cohort, 60±64 households are nearly 19 percentage
points less likely to hold stock outside of their pension. This could re¯ect an age eﬀect
and}or a cohort eﬀect (see Poterba and Samwick (1997) and Ameriks and Zeldes
(2001) for evidence on this issue). We see monotonic increases in equity ownership as
income and net worth increase."# For example, a household with income exceeding
$150K is 11 percentage points more likely to own equity relative to a household in the
$50±75K bracket and a household with wealth exceeding $500K is 30 percentage
points more likely to own equity relative to a household with wealth of $50±100K. A
college-educated household is signi®cantly more likely to own stock outside of the
retirement account. This is consistent with Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) who ®nd
stock ownership is larger among more educated groups at all income levels. Having
de®ned bene®t plan coverage, in addition to the DC plan, does not aﬀect the decision
to hold equity outside of the pension plan.
The saving preference proxy, IRA ownership, is a very strong and signi®cant
predictor of owning stock outside of one's pension plan. However, the inclusion of
HAVEIRA, LOVERISK, and HATERISK in the regression does not substantially
"# The net worth and income variables are to some extent endogenous. Equity ownership may lead to
higher income through dividends and capital gain realizations. I thus included labor income as opposed
to total income in the regressions and obtained virtually identical results. The coeﬃcients on the net
worth dummies are diﬃcult to interpret as they re¯ect both that wealthy households are more apt to hold
stock and that, given the historical equity premium, households that invested in stock are wealthier.
However, the coeﬃcient of interest, namely the impact of CHOICE, is not materially aﬀected by the
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Table 2. Regressions of equity ownership outside of DC plan
Dependent variable ¯ share of
non-pension ®nancial assets held in stock
Dependent variable ¯ own stock outside of DC plan " $1000
(Marginal changes in probability from Probit model reported)
(Marginal eﬀect evaluated at sample
means reported for Tobit model)
Households may have
more than one DC plan
Households with only
one DC plan
May have & one
DC plan
Households
with one plan
CHOICE 0±193** 0±167** 0±185** 0±177** 0±059** 0±059**
(0±037) (0±040) (0±045) (0±047) (0±009) (0±008)
Have IRA 0±375** 0±404** 0±172** 0±162**
(0±037) (0±054) (0±010) (0±013)
Love risk 0±011 ®0±029 0±018 0±009
(0±043) (0±056) (0±014) (0±018)
Hate risk ®0±135** ®0±029 ®0±078** ®0±036
(0±046) (0±064) (0±021) (0±026)
Have DB 0±003 0±027 ± ± 0±011 ±
(0±039) (0±041) (0±017)
Income 25±50 0±148** 0±129* 0±102 0±058 0±068** 0±036
(0±069) (0±073) (0±076) (0±079) (0±023) (0±024)
Income 50±75 0±205** 0±160* 0±199** 0±127 0±077** 0±032
(0±078) (0±084) (0±100) (0±104) (0±028) (0±032)
Income 75±150 0±283** 0±238** 0±233** 0±178 0±107** 0±047
(0±082) (0±091) (0±120) (0±128) (0±024) (0±029)
Income 150­ 0±316** 0±265** 0±374** 0±340** 0±103** 0±081
(0±094) (0±105) (0±134) (0±148) (0±040) (0±049)
NW 50±100 0±186** 0±143** 0±134* 0±114 0±056** 0±054*
(0±054) (0±056) (0±073) (0±077) (0±020) (0±022)
NW 100±250 0±305** 0±226** 0±297** 0±199** 0±065** 0±057*
(0±050) (0±056) (0±078) (0±086) (0±017) (0±032)
NW 250±500 0±390** 0±281** 0±343** 0±171 0±082** 0±054
(0±058) (0±070) (0±114) (0±128) (0±038) (0±074)
NW 500­ 0±570** 0±447** 0±549** 0±406** 0±130** 0±111**
(0±046) (0±066) (0±087) (0±116) (0±034) (0±046)
Age 30±39 ®0±067 ®0±066 ®0±074 ®0±073 ®0±018 0±003
(0±058) (0±060) (0±070) (0±072) (0±029) (0±037)
Age 40±49 ®0±102* ®0±095 ®0±131* ®0±153** ®0±059** ®0±060*
(0±059) (0±062) (0±070) (0±071) (0±032) (0±040)
Age 50±59 ®0±089 ®0±127* ®0±132 ®0±196** ®0±074** ®0±087**
(0±066) (0±068) (0±077) (0±070) (0±035) (0±047)
Age 60±64 ®0±213** ®0±256** ®0±204* ®0±244** ®0±148** ®0±138**
(0±073) (0±064) (0±077) (0±055) (0±046) (0±060)
Married 0±025 ®0±031 0±001 ®0±072 ®0±015 ®0±003
(0±061) (0±065) (0±074) (0±080) (0±031) (0±037)
Female 0±053 0±001 0±024 0±009 0±030 0±051
(0±074) (0±075) (0±087) (0±087) (0±034) (0±037)
College 0±197** 0±125** 0±173** 0±123** 0±059** 0±061**
(0±037) (0±040) (0±050) (0±053) (0±016) (0±024)
Log likelihood ®512±4 ®459±4 ®237±3 ®210±2 ®583±0 ®284±0
Pseudo R# 0±28 0±36 0±29 0±37 0±26 0±24
Sample size 1051 1051 518 518 1051 518
Notes: All regressors are indicator variables, so the marginal eﬀect of variable i in the
Probit model is estimated by U(Xwibwi­bi)±U(Xwibwi) where bi is the Probit coeﬃcient
corresponding to variable i and Xwi and bwi are vectors of regressor means and the
corresponding Probit coeﬃcients excluding variable i. This transformation is done to all
Probit coeﬃcients in subsequent tables.
The full sample is all households covered by at least one DC plan (may have multiple DC
plans and a DB plan). The `households with only one plan' sample is restricted to
households covered by only one pension plan that is a DC plan.
CHOICE¯1 if the household participates in a plan where they choose investments.
**¯underlying coeﬃcient is statistically signi®cant at 5% level.
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alter the estimated impact of participant choice upon equity ownership. To the extent
that these variables do a good job of capturing these preferences, this provides some
evidence that the coeﬃcient on CHOICE is not being driven by omitted attitudes
toward saving}risk tolerance. Similar conclusions are drawn when I focus on
households with one pension plan.
Papke (1998), Sunden and Surette (1998), Bajtelsmit and VanDerhei (1997), and
Hinz, McCarthy, and Turner (1997) all examine whether there are gender diﬀerences
in investment decisions within the pension plan. The latter three studies ®nd that
women tend to invest their retirement plan contributions in less risky assets than do
men. In some couples, the husband has a retirement plan with investment choice,
while in others the wife does. Are there diﬀerential impacts on a household's asset
allocation depending upon which spouse has the DC plan with CHOICE? Focussing
on married couples covered by one pension plan, the marginal eﬀect on the
probability of non-pension stock ownership is 0±215 (0±075) when the husband has the
DC plan with CHOICE, controlling for all other household characteristics. This is
very similar to the eﬀect when the wife has the DC plan with choice (marginal eﬀect
is 0±227 (0±091)). Thus, there is no evidence of diﬀerential spousal eﬀects upon
household asset allocation in this context.
It is worth noting that the marginal eﬀect of CHOICE, estimated after controlling
for all the household characteristics, is still three quarters of the obsered
(unconditional) diﬀerence in the probability of owning stock on own-account
between the CHOICE and NOCHOICE households. Focussing on households
covered by only one DC plan, the estimated marginal impact of CHOICE only falls
from 21 to 18 percentage points with the inclusion of household covariates.
Demographics, the ®nancial situation, and proxies for risk tolerance are signi®cant
and important predictors of whether a household owns stock outside of the pension.
While controlling for them does lessen the eﬀect of investment choice upon non-
pension asset allocation, it does so modestly. The presence of choice in the pension
plan is not a controlled experiment, so one cannot rule out that unobserved
heterogeneity in worker's preferences may also explain the result. It is reassuring,
though, that the controls for observable household characteristics and the risk
preference proxies do not mitigate the estimated eﬀect of choice very much.
3.2 Regressions of share of assets in equities
Table 2 also presents regression estimates for the share of non-pension ®nancial assets
held in equities. I present marginal eﬀects derived from a Tobit speci®cation. The
pattern of coeﬃcients is similar to that found in the ownership regressions. Evaluated
at the sample means, households who direct investments in their DC plan hold 6
percentage points more of their non-pension ®nancial assets in equities. This is a
signi®cant and economically substantial eﬀect, given that the average proportion of
non-retirement plan ®nancial assets held in equities is 0±17 for the sample (0±14 for the
sample of households covered by only one plan)."$
"$ Speci®cations were also estimated with the equity share of total non-retirement account assets, both
®nancial and non®nancial, as the dependent variable. Evaluated at the sample means, households who240 S. Weisbenner
The education hypothesis I have outlined above has predictions regarding the
ownership decision, but oﬀers no prediction regarding the amount of stock held
conditional on ownership. The education hypothesis suggests having employees
decide at work how best to invest their pension assets will educate the employees
about ®nancial planning. This education may spillover and cause households to start
to pay closer attention to their non-pension asset allocation and to start to invest
some of their own-account assets in the stock market. It is more doubtful that,
conditional on already owning stock, having a say in how pension assets are allocated
will provide much additional education."% Indeed, I ®nd that the positive correlation
reported above is driven by the ownership decision. Conditional on ownership,
participation in a CHOICE plan has no signi®cant eﬀect on the level of non-
retirement account equity holdings (results not reported)."& For the remainder of the
paper I will focus on stock ownership, as that is where we would predict any
educational spillovers to occur.
3.3 Robustness checks
While consistent with an education eﬀect, legitimate concerns can be raised with the
results and their interpretation. Ultimately, the concern about investor heterogeneity
biasing the results cannot be dismissed. However, robustness checks such as focussing
attention on the `®nancially unsavvy' and testing for substitution between retirement
account and own-account equity holdings provide supporting evidence for an
education eﬀect.
Results focusing on `®nancially unsay'
Clearly, caution must be exercised when interpreting the causality behind the
correlation between choice and stock ownership. In Section 3±1, I found that
controlling for observable household attributes and preferences does not substantially
weaken the observed correlation between non-pension stock ownership and
investment choice. This provides some evidence that the impact of CHOICE re¯ects
an education eﬀect, rather than some omitted variable bias.
Nonetheless, half of the households which participated in a DC plan with
investment choice had IRA assets and}or reported they were willing to take above
average risks to earn above average returns, compared to only one third of
households with no investment choice."' The open question is do the observable
variables, particularly HAVEIRA, suﬃciently control for unobserved `®nancial
savvy' which could explain a correlation between CHOICE and stock ownership?
direct investments in their DC plan hold 1±5 percentage points (t-statistic¯5±3) more of their total assets
in equities relative to those who do not. The average for the sample is 4±8%. Similar results are obtained
for the restricted sample of households covered by one pension plan.
"% The type of DC plan may impact stock holdings, conditional on ownership, if DC plans without choice
invest funds in a systematically undesirable way that is oﬀset by households adjusting non-pension
portfolios. I address this possibility in Section 4.
"& This should not be too surprising given that the ratio of equity holdings to ®nancial assets, conditional
on owning stock, is very similar across the two groups.
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Table 3a. Income, net worth, and demographics of NOSAVERS with arious
pension plans
Have DC plan(s)
(at least one
with CHOICE)
Have DC plan(s)
(none have
CHOICE)
Only 1 pension plan
(is a DC plan
with CHOICE)
Only 1 pension plan
(is a DC plan
without CHOICE)
g observations 313 162 145 102
g households 9±5 million 4±6 million 4±4 million 2±9 million
Income and net worth (in thousands of $)
(the mean, with its standard error in parentheses, and the 25th and 75th% are reported)
Income 49±54 0 ±34 0 ±03 5 ±6
(2±1) (2±6) (1±5) (3±6)
25th±75th% 30±60 22±51 27±47 20±44
Net worth 71±46 1 ±06 5 ±34 6 ±4
(16±0) (15±8) (33±6) (20±4)
25th±75th% 11±86 8±7±67 6±2±71 6±8±58
Financial assets 27±31 6 ±02 7 ±61 0 ±5
(15±6) (8±6) (33±4) (11±8)
25th±75th% 1±4±19 1±0±14 1±1±12 0±8±11
Equity ownership outside of the pension plan
Probability own 0±17 0±07 0±14 0±05
stock " $1000 (0±02) (0±02) (0±03) (0±02)
Ratio of stock 0±10 0±04 0±09 0±03
holdings to total
®nancial assets
(0±01) (0±01) (0±02) (0±01)
Stock}Fin given 0±42 0±32 0±46 0±32
own stock (0±04) (0±06) (0±06) (0±07)
Demographics
Age 40±64 0 ±03 9 ±53 8 ±9
(0±6) (0±8) (0±8) (0±9)
Married 0±70 0±69 0±60 0±61
(0±03) (0±04) (0±04) (0±05)
Female 0±19 0±21 0±27 0±27
(0±02) (0±03) (0±04) (0±04)
College 0±31 0±35 0±28 0±32
(0±03) (0±04) (0±04) (0±05)
Notes: Data source is the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances and reported statistics are
weighted to re¯ect the population. See text for variable de®nitions.
CHOICE refers to a pension plan in which the employee makes investment decisions.
A household is a NOSAVER if it has no IRA assets and does not report it is willing to
take above average risks to earn above average returns.
The mean is reported for all variables and the standard error of the mean is in parentheses.
`Stock}Fin' is the average of the ratio of non-pension stock holdings to ®nancial assets.
Does the estimated CHOICE coeﬃcient in the full speci®cation represent a pure
education eﬀect, or is it still contaminated by unobservable saving preferences that
are not accounted for by the observable household characteristics and attitudes
towards risk-taking?
I attempt to address this concern by estimating regressions only on the subgroup
of households for whom NOSAVER is one. Recall, NOSAVER is one if the
household has NO IRA assets and reports it is NOT willing to take above average
risks to earn above average returns. A priori, we would expect these households to be
`®nancially unsavvy'. Thus, I drop all observations of households that have any IRA
assets (HAVEIRA¯1) or report that they are willing to take above average risks to
obtain above average returns (LOVERISK¯1). The households that I exclude, for242 S. Weisbenner
Table 3b. Retirement plan assets and saing preferences for NOSAVERS with
arious pension plans
Have DC plan(s)
(at least one with
CHOICE)
Have DC plan(s)
(none have
CHOICE)
Only 1 pension plan
(is a DC plan
with CHOICE)
Only 1 pension plan
(is a DC plan
without CHOICE)
g observations 313 162 145 102
g households 9±5 million 4±6 million 4±4 million 2±9 million
DC plan assets 24±81 5 ±71 2 ±21 0 ±4
(2±8) (2±5) (1±3) (1±6)
25th±75th% 2±5±30 1±7±20 2±0±15 1±2±12
Share of plan in stock 0±55 0±52 0±51 0±49
(0±02) (0±03) (0±03) (0±04)
% plans mostly or 0±24 0±30 0±29 0±29
all stock (0±02) (0±04) (0±04) (0±05)
g Pension plans 1±81 ±51 1
(0±05) (0±05)
Have DB plan? 0±29 0±25 0 0
(0±03) (0±03)
IRA assets ± ± ± ±
25th±75th%
Share of IRA in stock ± ± ± ±
Have IRA? 0 0 0 0
Love risk? 0 0 0 0
Hate risk? 0±38 0±51 0±40 0±52
(0±03) (0±04) (0±04) (0±05)
NOSAVER? 1 1 1 1
Notes: See text for variable de®nitions.
CHOICE refers to a pension plan in which the employee makes investment decisions.
DC plan assets are in thousands of dollars.
The mean is reported for all variables and the standard error of the mean is in parentheses.
whom NOSAVER is zero, may have a predisposition to save and}or a willingness to
invest in equities, even without exposure to participant-directed retirement plans.
Tables 3a and b reports characteristics of NOSAVER households across the
diﬀerent types of pension plans (CHOICE and NOCHOICE households in general
and then among households with just one plan). The sample is again weighted using
1995 population weights in the SCF. Notice how the CHOICE and NOCHOICE
groups are much more comparable in virtually every category except equity
ownership on own-account. Among households covered by one plan, the average
values of income, net worth, DC plan assets, and all demographic characteristics of
households in a participant-directed plan are not statistically diﬀerent from those in
a plan without choice. Particularly striking is that the level of stock holdings in
retirement accounts are very similar across DC plans with and without investment
choice.
Table 4 reports regression results, analogous to Table 2 but estimated on the
`®nancially unsavvy' (NOSAVER) households. The point estimates suggest a
signi®cant education spillover eﬀect from participant choice (7±8 percentage point
change in the probability of non-pension equity ownership) for this subpopulation.
This is a rather large eﬀect, given that only one in seven NOSAVER households holdInestment choice teach households to hold more equity 243
Table 4. Regressions of equity ownership outside of DC plan for `NOSAVERS'
(NOSAVERS hae no IRA assets and are not willing to take aboea erage risks)
Dependent variable¯own stock outside of DC plan "$1000
Marginal changes in probability from Probit model reported
May have & one DC plan Households with one DC plan
CHOICE 0±077** 0±072*
(0±031) (0±037)
Have IRA ± ±
Love risk ± ±
Hate risk ®0±032 0±008
(0±033) (0±038)
Have DB ®0±002 ±
(0±035)
Income 25±50 0±098* 0±065
(0±056) (0±052)
Income 50±75 0±135* 0±172*
(0±087) (0±120)
Income 75±150 0±262** 0±170
(0±124) (0±168)
Income 150­ 0±088 0±330
(0±149) (0±341)
Net worth 50±100 0±133** 0±088
(0±057) (0±065)
Net worth 100±250 0±204** 0±151*
(0±068) (0±100)
Net worth 250±500 0±400** 0±272
(0±131) (0±334)
Net worth 500­ 0±532** 0±433**
(0±159) (0±236)
Age 30±39 ®0±027 ®0±005
(0±045) (0±050)
Age 40±49 ®0±091* ®0±097*
(0±043) (0±044)
Age 50±59 ®0±079 ®0±056
(0±039) (0±045)
Age 60±64 ®0±089 ®0±067
(0±041) (0±052)
Married 0±041 0±016
(0±050) (0±056)
Female 0±075 0±059
(0±082) (0±080)
College 0±072** 0±067
(0±038) (0±049)
Log likelihood ®173±7 ®77±2
Pseudo R# 0±18 0±17
Sample size 475 247
Notes: In the left panel, the sample is all households with at least one DC plan (may have
multiple plans and DB plan). In the right panel, the sample is restricted to households
covered by only one pension plan that is a DC plan.
CHOICE¯1 if the household participates in a plan in which they choose investments.
**¯underlying Probit coeﬃcient is statistically signi®cant at 5% level, *¯coeﬃcient is
signi®cant at 10% level.
stock outside of their retirement account. The ®nancial and demographic explanators
are statistically important to the model (p-value of 0±00 for exclusion test), but their
impact on equity holdings does not substantially mitigate the estimated eﬀect of
investment choice. This is not a shock, given the similarities across the groups shown
in Tables 3a and b.244 S. Weisbenner
The results in Table 4 are consistent with investment choice in pension plans
aﬀecting portfolio allocation decisions outside of the retirement plan. However, given
the selection rule used to obtain the sample, the magnitude of the results obtained
should not be extrapolated beyond this subpopulation. For the remainder of the
paper, I will report results estimated over the full sample and over the NOSAVER
subsample.
Portfolio rebalancing
To this point I have ignored that households may want to balance their holdings of
diﬀerent assets across retirement and non-retirement accounts. Households may have
target levels of ®xed income assets and equity they wish to achieve, and they are
willing to adjust retirement account assets and}or non-pension balances to achieve
the desired targets. For example, suppose all households have the same desired
holding of equity. Also suppose pension plans in which the worker has no choice as
to how funds are invested put all the money in company stock. We would then expect
the own-account holdings of households with pension plans with participant choice
to be composed more of equities relative to those covered by pension plans controlled
by the employer. The correlation between CHOICE and own-account stock holdings
need not re¯ect any education spillover, but could simply occur due to such portfolio
rebalancing.
It is unlikely that this could be driving the CHOICE coeﬃcient, as the fraction of
pension plan assets held in equities is actually fairly similar whether or not the worker
gets to direct the investments (see Tables 1a, b and 3a, b). Nonetheless, I included as
extra covariates the fraction of retirement account assets held in the form of stock and
categorical variables for the size of a household's DC plan balance relative to its non-
pension ®nancial assets. Besides picking up a substitution eﬀect, the coeﬃcient on the
fraction of DC plan assets held in stock could also re¯ect household preferences and
risk tolerance. The categorical variables for the ratio of retirement to non-retirement
®nancial assets are included because the larger is this ratio, the less important it is for
a household to worry about how it handles its non-pension portfolio and perhaps the
less likely it is to own stock outside its pension plan.
The marginal eﬀect of CHOICE is essentially unchanged after adding the new
regressors (results are reported in Table 5). Bodie and Crane (1997) document a
positive correlation in asset composition across accounts when examining TIAA-
CREF participants. I also ®nd little evidence for portfolio rebalancing as the
equitization of retirement account assets is positiely and signi®cantly correlated with
non-retirement stock ownership. The strong correlation disappears, however, when
we focus on the NOSAVER or ®nancially unsavvy households. This suggests that the
extent of equitization in retirement plans helps proxy for preferences and risk
tolerance that carry over to own-account portfolios. The results also indicate that
households for whom the DC plan is a large component ("80%) of total ®nancial
wealth are less apt to own stock outside of their pension."(
"( Of course, this could just be a mechanical result as near zero non-pension assets will imply a large DC
plan}®nancial assets ratio and zero own-account stock ownership. To combat this built in correlationInestment choice teach households to hold more equity 245
Table 5. Regressions of equity ownership outside of DC plan (controls for % of DC
plan inested in stock and size of DC plan relatiet on o n -pension ®nancial assets)
Dependent variable¯own stock outside of DC plan "$1000
Marginal changes in probability from Probit model reported
May have more than one
DC plan
Households with only one
DC plan
Full sample NOSAVERS Full sample NOSAVERS
CHOICE 0±170** 0±078** 0±168** 0±063*
(0±040) (0±028) (0±046) (0±033)
% of DC plan 0±182** 0±056 0±146** 0±021
invested in stock (0±052) (0±041) (0±063) (0±045)
DC plan assets}®nancial assets
"0±25 and !10 ±014 0±021 ®0±041 ®0±019
(0±047) (0±042) (0±056) (0±039)
"1 and !4 ®0±066 ®0±004 ®0±123** ®0±041
(0±050) (0±040) (0±055) (0±036)
"4 ®0±236** ®0±114** ®0±254** ®0±115**
(0±051) (0±034) (0±054) (0±038)
Sample size 1051 475 518 247
Notes: The full speci®cation is estimated. Coeﬃcients for the other variables are not
reported.
Financial assets do not include DC plan assets.
**¯underlying Probit coeﬃcient is statistically signi®cant at 5% level.
*¯underlying Probit coeﬃcient is statistically signi®cant at 10% level.
4 Conclusion
This paper studies whether the design of pension plans, in this case who directs the
investment of contributions, has an impact on the employee's ®nances. Speci®cally,
are households that make decisions regarding pension plan investments more apt to
hold equity on own-account relative to households whose pension plan assets are
controlled by the employer? Using the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances, I ®nd that
households covered by pension plans in which they have investment choice are
signi®cantly more apt to hold stock outside of their retirement plan than are
households with pension plans oﬀering no such choice. One interpretation of this
®nding is that having to direct investments may provide the participant with
education that in¯uences ®nancial decisions.
However, caution must be exercised when interpreting why there is a correlation
between choice and stock ownership, because it is impossible to de®nitively establish
the causality of this relationship. One can argue that the direction of the causality is
reversed. The presence of a pension plan with choice may re¯ect the preferences of the
employee (®nancially savvy workers select into jobs oﬀering plans with choice).
I re-estimated the regression for households with non-retirement ®nancial assets in excess of $20,000 and
found the same pattern in the coeﬃcients.246 S. Weisbenner
Ultimately, the presence of choice in the pension plan is not a controlled experiment,
so one cannot rule out that unobserved heterogeneity in worker's preferences may
also explain the result.
Realizing the potential selectivity bias issues, the paper uses multiple methods to
control for investor heterogeneity. While observable household characteristics and
risk preference proxies are signi®cant and important predictors of whether a
household owns stock outside of the pension, their inclusion does not substantially
lessen the estimated eﬀect of the eﬀect of investment choice upon non-pension asset
allocation. Other robustness checks, such as focusing attention on a sample of
`®nancially unsavvy' households and testing for substitution between retirement
account and own-account stock holdings, were also conducted to test whether
hypotheses other than the education eﬀect could explain the observed correlation
between investment choice in pension plans and stock ownership outside of the
pension plan.
If this education}spillover eﬀect is real, what is driving it? Are workers able to self-
educate simply by observing the repercussions of their investment choices (learning by
doing)? Or do participant-directed plans also provide more or better retirement
education through seminars and reading materials that facilitate changes in ®nancial
behavior both inside and outside the retirement plan? As policymakers consider
proposals to partially privatize Social Security, better understanding of what really
educates plan participants and drives changes in ®nancial behavior is needed.
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